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Recent Trends in United Kingdom
Anti-Avoidance Law
Ian A. Saunders*
I.

INTRODUCTION

United Kingdom's approach to countering tax avoidance is a
T hepiecemeal
one. The civil law concept of "abuse of law" has not

been used in the United Kingdom,1 nor does there exist a general statutory anti-avoidance rule.2 Thus the law has evolved and developed
through legislation, Inland Revenue practice and judicial decisions. To
these traditional methods of legal development a further dimension is
now of increasing importance. Not only are there a number of antiavoidance provisions in the various double taxation agreements which
the United Kingdom has with other states,3 but there are also such provisions in the new body of law embodied in the European Community
Directives on Taxation.4
The armoury of anti-avoidance weapons should not, however, be
seen as planned, complementary lines of attack. Each has developed
separately. It is safe to assume that the judge-made doctrine referred to
below would not have taken effect in its present form if a general anti-

* Ian Saunders MA, LL.M (Cantab) is a barrister with Touche Ross, part of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International. He was formerly a lecturer in the law of taxation at London University.
' The most obvious comparison is with French law. See Maurice Cozian, What is Abuse of
Law?, 1991 INTERTAX 103 (Feb. 1991). It should also be noted that although the text refers to the
United Kingdom, it is strictly true only of English law. Scots law on this point is quite different.
2 For example, there is no equivalent in U.K. statutory law to the provisions of the Canadian Income Tax Act denying a tax benefit which would result, directly or indirectly from a transaction or series of transactions that are deemed to be "avoidance transactions." Canadian Income
Tax Act, R.S.C., ch. 148 § 244, 245 (1983). An "avoidance transaction" is defined for this purpose as any transaction that would result, directly or indirectly, in a tax benefit, unless the
transaction may reasonably be considered to have been undertaken or arranged primarily for bona
fide purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit, or a transaction that is part of a series of
transactions which series would have that result. Id. § 245(3).
3 See infra section IVA.
4 See Peter H. Schonewille, Some questions on the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the
Merger Directive, 1992 INTERTAX 13 (Jan. 1992). See also infra section IVB.
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avoidance provision had existed in statute. 5 On the other hand, any such
doctrine would still be moulded by judicial methods and constraints
which are of general application. Thus the reticence of U.K. judges to
openly assume for themselves a legislative role has led them to see antiavoidance doctrine as one of statutory construction6 or "statutory application."7 In fact, the judicial role has been twofold: first to construct
their own doctrine, and secondly to interpret legislative rules in this
sphere.'
The purpose of this article is to highlight the aspects of the U.K.
system which distinguish it from that of other jurisdictions in this sphere
and to do this by analyzing certain recent developments. The objectives
are thus to examine critically some of the latest changes and trends, to
make comparisons between the different modes of development, and to
draw some conclusions on the present state of the law and the directions
in which it is moving.
The division that has been made between treaties, statutes and judicial decisions is essential as there are differences in approach which go
beyond those inherent in the form of the source in question. These differences will be brought out in the discussion below. On the other hand,
it must be recognised at the same time that such divisions are artificial
in the sense that any approach to anti-avoidance must be viewed in its
totality; each division takes its place as a part of the full armoury referred to above.
I.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The legislative methods of attack used in legislation are multifarious
and not susceptible to closely defined classification. The choice of provi5 Compare the French tax system which has such a provision embodied in Article L.64,
Book of Fiscal Procedures.
6 "[Ihe taxpayers advanced the proposition that the Ramsay principle was not one of statutory construction but of some other sort ....
I consider this proposition to be unsound." Craven v. white, [1988] 3 All E.R. 495, 538 (H.L.)(per Lord Jauncey) (emphasis added).
7 The term "statutory application" was coined by Nourse L. J. Fitzwilliam v. I.R.C., [1992]
S.T.C. 185, 198 (C.A.).
8 The recently reported decision of Pepper v. Hart, [1992] S.T.C. 898 (H.L.), marks a
historic change in the U.K. courts' power to intirpret statutes. The case involved taxation, the
court holding that a benefit in kind received by an employee should be valued at its marginal
cost for purposes of taxation in the hands of the recipient employee. The case's importance,
however, goes beyond the sphere of taxation. For the House of Lords held that it is permissible
for judges to refer to Hansard, the official report of Parliamentary proceedings, in interpreting a
statutory provision, though only in limited circumstances. Hitherto there has' been a complete bar.
The "limited circumstances" are where the wording of the provision is ambiguous and, in addition, there is a clear statement as to the provision's meaning or purpose by a minister or other
promoter of the Bill.
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sions considered is, of necessity, eclectic. In broad terms, however, several different approaches can be detected. First, legislation may be designed to counter a particular type of scheme.9 This type of legislation
attempts to define the scheme or transaction to be covered and sets out
the tax implications which follow. At its simplest level this is a comparatively straightforward exercise. For example, the deduction of expenses,
including incidental expenses, incurred in providing business entertainment is prohibited in computing taxable profits.' The mischief targeted
is the possibility of reciprocal arrangements leading to the leisure activities of businessmen being subsidised by the Revenue.
On the other hand, many schemes have necessitated attack with
more complex provisions. The danger here is that the legislation may go
further than is necessary to counter the tax avoidance element of the
particular type of scheme, and thus bring in its wake all the concomitant
consequences for ordinary commercial transactions. This type of antiavoidance legislation can be found in provisions relating to group and
cons6rtium relief for companies." These provisions demonstrate a number of points and are worthy of a comparatively lengthy discussion.
Rules set out in the Income and Corporation Taxes Act determine,
in part, whether companies are in a group or consortium relationship.' 2
This is mainly relevant for purposes of group and consortium relief, i.e.
consoliation for tax purposes, group income elections and advance corporation tax surrenders from a parent to a subsidiary. An economic
ownership test has been superimposed on the ordinary requirements of

9 An example of this can be found in the deep gains legislation. Debt securities were used
to enable UK investors to take advantage of the more favourable tax regime for capital gains, by
expressing what would otherwise have been an income return as capital which aims to treat any
gain on a security which may be payable at a "deep gain" as income. Finance Act, 1989, ch.
26, § 94 and sch. 11 (Eng.). The Finance Act (No. 2) of 1992 modifies these provisions,
recognising -that the original legislation was drawn too widely so that certain default or event
risk clauses potentially operated to render a security within the deep gain definition, though this
was not intended. Finance Act (No. 2), 1992, § 33 and sch. 7 (Eng.) [hereinafter FA 1992].
'0 Incom9 and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch. 1, § 577 (Eng.) [hereinafter ICTA 1988].
" The relevant part of the present legislation is now contained in ICTA 1988, sch. 18, as
amended by FA 1992, § 24 and sch. 6. As will become apparent from the discussion below, the
U.K. law in this sphere is totally different in form and substance from that operative in Canada
and the U.S. In Canada, the basic rule is that unused losses may be claimed only by the corporation that incurred them and not by related companies. The main exemptions pertain to situations within a corporate reorganisation. In the U.S., while NOLs (net operating losses) can be
utilised in the group situation, if there is a greater than 50% ownership change in a loss corporation within a three-year period, an annual limit on the use of NOLs, based on a fraction of
the company's value, will generally be imposed. This significantly limits the possibility of abusive tax situations including "shell corporations" with unused losses.
12 ICTA 1988, ch. 1, sch. 18.
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ownership of ordinary share capital.' 3 The purpose of the economic
ownership test is simply to confine the benefits of group or consortium
membership to companies in specified economically connected relationships. Thus one is required to look further than the mere ownership of
ordinary share capital in order to establish, in basic terms, who gains or
loses if the company does well or badly. Thus there is a requirement
that in addition to one company being a 75% subsidiary of the other,
the parent company, by virtue of its equitable ownership of certain securities, has to be entitled to at least 75% of the subsidiary's distributable
profits and to the same percentage of its assets on a winding up. The
75% entitlement is thus the crux of the test.
One facet of these anti-avoidance rules on economic ownership was
quickly acknowledged to be too wide. The legislation includes within
the term "equity holders" a loan creditor of a company in respect of a
loan which is not an "ordinary commercial loan."' 14 Prior to 27 July
1989, non-commercial loans comprised:
(i)
(ii)

losses convertible into shares and securities; and
loans carrying rights to additional income or capital in excess of
normal commercial terms.'s

The width of this definition led, in its application, to a distortion of the
equity holder/debtor relationship so that group relief was denied for no
good reason in many cases.
As a result, amendments were made in the Finance Acts of 1989
and 1991, making clear that a loan is not prevented from being "commercial" in character simply because it carries rights of conversion into
shares or securities in the company's quoted parent company. The 1989
amendments provided that subsidiary companies raising finance using
such securities do not thereby lose their group relief. Similarly, losses
carrying rights of conversion into fixed-rate preference shares or normal
commercial loans are not precluded from being ordinary commercial
loans. 16 The 1991 amendments provide that loans made on terms under
which the rate of interest is to be reduced in the event of an improvement of the company's business or of an increase in the value of its
assets. Though strictly speaking, under the above definition, these loans
are not commercial, loanholders are not treated as participators in the
equity of the company. 17 Secondly, loans which are limited or non-re13 FA 1989, ch. 26, § 101, amending ITCA 1988, ch. 1, sch. 18, para. 1.
14 ICTA 1988, ch. 1, sch. 18, para. l(1)(b).
"s Id. para. 1(5).
16 FA 1989, ch. 26, § 101, amending ICTA 1988, ch. 1, sch. 18, para. 1.
17 Finance Act, 1991, ch. 31, § 77(1) (Eng.) [hereinafter FA 1991] amending ICTA 1988,
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course in nature and the security for the payment of principal or interest
is restricted to land other than dealing property are also treated as commercial loans."8
An important extension of the economic ownership test was the
requirement that, where there were "arrangements" in force under which
an equity holder's entitlement to profits or assets could be different as
compared with the entitlement if the arrangements did not take effect,
the relevant percentage tests were to be applied as follows: i) as if effect had been given to the arrangements, and ii) as if it had not. The
lesser entitlement was then used.19 In other words, if the parent
company's holding would fall below 75% either in the event of effect
being given to those arrangements or on the basis that the arrangements
were ignored, then the relief is not available. The 75% test is not satisfied.
Amendment of the above rules was prompted by the decision of J.
Sainsbury plc. v. O'Connor.0 The main issue in this case was whether
the term "arrangements" covered options under which there might be a
future change in the ownership of shares. Sainsbury owned 75% of the
shares in Homebase while a Dutch subsidiary owned the remaining 25%.
Put and call options, in force for a time, governed 5% of Homebase's
share capital. These rights had not been exercized. Had effect been
given to the arrangements, Sainsbury would have only had a 70% interest and so failed the economic ownership test for a group. Nevertheless,
the court held that the options did not constitute "arrangements" and
thus did not deprive Sainsbury of group relief.
The Revenue saw this decision as a means of defeating commercially realistic anti-avoidance rules designed to limit group and consortium relief related companies. Therefore, an announcement was speedily
made, on 15 November 1991, stating that the Government would enact
legislation designed to overturn the Sainsbury case." The promised legislation, now contained in the Finance (No.2) Act 1992, would apply to
arrangements made on or after the date of the statement.
The crucial provisions in the new Act extended the definition of the
term "arrangements" to encompass "option arrangements." 22 The definition of such arrangements, which need not be in writing, requires com-

ch. 1, sch. 18, para. 1.
18 Id.

'9 ICTA 1988, ch. 1, sch. 18, para. 5(3).
20 [1991] S.T.C. 318 (C.A.)
21 Statement by the Financial

Secretary to the Treasury published on 15 November 1991.

[1991] S.T.I. 1042.
22 ICTA 1988, ch. 1, sch. 18, para. 5(5B), amended by FA 1992, ch. 48, sch. 6.
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pliance with two conditions:
(1)

arrangements are ones by virtue of which there could be a variation in -

(a)
(b)
(2)

the percentage of profits to which any of the equity holders is entitled on the profit distribution, or
the percentage of assets to which any of the equity holders
is entitled on the notional winding up;

under the arrangements, the variation could result from the exercise of any of the following rights (option rights) (a) a right to acquire shares or securities in the second
compa

(b)

ny referred to above; or

a right to require a person to acquire shares or securities
in that company.'

If an arrangement falls within the above definition, the percentage entitlement is calculated on the alternative assumption that the arrangements
either (i) have, or (ii) have not, taken effect. The lower entitlement is
then used. The point is well illustrated by the facts in the Sainsbury
case since the transactions involved in that decision would now constitute "arrangements" under the Act. The fact that Sainsbury would only
own 70% of the equity if effect were given to the "arrangements"
would deny the possibility of relief. The fact that a 75% entitlement
would remain if the options were not exercised is irrelevant. The lower
entitlement is used.
The present amendments were initially issued in draft form. Comments were submitted to the Revenue on a number of points including
the length and complexity of the legislation. However, the relevant point
for the present article is that a number of bodies drew attention to the
fact that the definition set out above would cause problems for joint
venture arrangements. In virtually every case in a joint venture there is
a mechanism for its conclusion, typically by one party buying out the
other. This and other common arrangements involving pre-emption rights
would fall within the definition of "option arrangements" so that consortium relief would be denied. The Financial Secretary to the Treasury
rejected a change to the definition when the Finance Bill was debated in
the Committee stage in the House of Commons.24 He did, however,
promise a Statement of Practice and extra statutory concession to deal
with the problems of joint venture arrangements.2 5
23Id.
24 Committee Hearings, 23 June 1992 HANSARD 240.
2 A Statement of Practice and Extra Statutory Concession were eventually published on 13
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This particular saga, as suggested above, is instructive of the unsatisfactory way in which changes in this sphere of revenue law are taking
place. The starting point was a set of provisions containing rules beneficial to groups or consortia. Superimposed on these provisions were the
anti-avoidance rules in the form of the economic ownership test. Those
rules, justifiable in their basic content, were seen to have been drawn
too widely, the breadth of the "normal commercial loan" definition providing one illustration of this. Amending legislation, therefore, followed.
The chronology of the further changes in this sphere can be described as follows. The Sainsbury case embodied a decision which was
at variance with the Revenue's understanding of the interpretation to be
afforded to the term "arrangements." The Revenue reacted immediately
and announced its intention to reverse the decision. The Statement by
the Financial Secretary to the Treasury declared that the decision undermined a view of the law which had long been accepted. This view of
the pre-existing law is, at the very least, open to doubt.26 So, Step 1
was the Sainsbury decision. Step 2 was the Statement of the Financial
Secretary which promised draft legislation. Step 3 was the publication of
the draft legislation 7 for the purposes of consultation.
The unsatisfactory nature of the method of reform can already .be
seen. First, the Statement of 15 November 1991 promised legislation
which would have retrospective effect in the sense that it,
would apply
to arrangements made on or after that date (though the legislation had
not then been published, let alone enacted). In the period between 15
November 1991 and 29 January 1992 a taxpayer could not know the
form or scope of the promised amendments. This itself is perturbing.
The former understanding, until recently accepted by the Revenue, was
that legislation should not be introduced which would retrospectively
increase any taxpayer's liability.2" Now it seems that,
[w]here it is discovered that the tax law does not have the effect that
the Government and taxpayers generally thought it had, there are circumstances in which it is right to introduce legislation to restore the
position retrospectively to what it was thought to be.29
January 1993.
Tom Scott, A Sledgehammer to Sainsbury, 1992 BRrr. TAX. REV. 65 (1992).
The draft legislation was published on 29 January 1992.
"" This is different from the fundamental rule of English law that no statute shall be construed to have retrospective operation unless such a construction is clear in the terms of the Act.
In re Athlumney, [1898] 2 Q.B. 547, 551-52. The more general convention against retrospective
legislation forms part of the rule of law and, in the specific spheres of taxation, has links with
the historical treatment of taxation as "penal" and a form of confiscation of property. See Robert
Stevens, Law and Politics 170-71, 264 (1978).
29 Written Answer to Parliamentary Question, Committee Hearings 29 June 1992 HANSARD
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The practical result was that for several months the taxpayer was in a
position where he could not know the legal rules which were being
operated. And this uncertainty existed in an area of real commercial
importance.
But matters did not end there. Step 4 was the consultation process
which, as indicated above, resulted in no significant changes being made
to the draft clauses. Step 5 was the enacting of the legislation presented
"as a package" with the promise of a Statement of Practice or extra
statutory concession to mitigate the full rigours of its strict application.
Step 6, the publication of the Statement or concession in final form, is
awaited.
The fundamental criticism is an obvious one, yet no less serious for
that. Even before the provisions became law it was recognised that they
were defectively drafted. Instead of amending the legislation as drafted,
it was stated that amendment would follow by concession. Such a method of legislating is indefensible and further comment is superfluous.
Other categories of legislation can be indicated. For example, certain legislation substitutes a different tax treatment from the normal one
if the transaction or scheme is between connected persons or is not at
arm's length.3 ° Other legislation depends on the taxpayer's motive.3 t
Some rules straddle more than one category. The statutory provisions
which can be viewed under the broad heading of "thin capitalisation"
can be so regarded.32 Under the principal provision relating to "thin

378 (per Financial Secretary to the Treasury).
3o See, e.g., ICTA 1988, ch. 1, § 209 (governing the payment of interest between related
parties). Compare the Canadian treatment dealt with in Robert Couzin, Of Arm's Length, and Not
Dealing Thereat, 26 Can. Tax J. 271 (1978). The principles set out in that article still hold good
despite its date of publication.
31 See, e.g., ICTA 1988, ch. 1, § 787(1) (governing receipt of a tax deduction for an interest payment).
Relief shall not be given to any person under any provisions of the Tax Acts in respect of any payment of interest if a scheme has been effected or arrangements have
been made such that the sole or main benefit that might be expected to accrue to that
person from the transaction under which the interest is paid was the obtaining of a
reduction in tax liability by the means of any such relief.
Id. See also Brian J.Arnold, Is Interest a Capital Expense?, 40 CAN. TAX J. 535 (1992) (discussing the Canadian approach).
3 The problems arising under this broad heading are faced by all tax systems. In Canada,
section 18(4) of the Income Tax Act contains specific provisions that deal with the limitation of
a deduction, for income tax purposes, of interest paid or payable by thinly capitalised corporations. But, in addition, it is important to note that Canada has special rules applicable to the
deductibility of interest which must be taken into account when considering the capitalisation of
a Canadian subsidiary or related company. For interest to be deductible it must be paid pursuant
to a legal obligation to pay interest, paid in the year, or payable in respect of the year, and the
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capitalisation,"33 any interest (or other distribution out of the assets of
a company) in respect of securities is treated as a distribution for U.K.
tax purposes where the securities issued by the company are held by a
non-resident company of which the issuing company is a 75% subsidiary, or where both companies are 75% subsidiaries of a third non-resident company.3
This treatment of interest may be overridden or modified by double
taxation arrangements. Though the terms of the agreements vary, many
of them disapply this distribution rule. A common limitation applies
where the interest paid is more than would be paid but for the existence
of a "special relationship" so that no relief is given in respect of the
excess interest paid. In general terms, two types of "special relationship"
clauses exist. Some require examination of the amount of the debt in
respect of which the interest is paid. In such cases the clause, if generally accepted, restricts only the relief where an excessive rate of interest

interest must be reasonable. Interest expense in excess of a "reasonable rate" will be denied
under section 68 of the Income Tax Act when it relates to Canadian resident lenders and under
section 69(2) where it is paid to a related or associated non-resident lender. The Canadian approach to thin capitalisation is to deny the deductibility of interest expense paid to specified nonresidents on that portion of the debt that is in excess of three times the borrowing corporation's
equity. The Canadian Income Tax Act, therefore, identifies and deals with thin capitalisation
upon a simple formula basis. For an excellent recent analysis of the rules, see Tim Edgar, The
Thin Capitalization Rules: Role and Reform, 40 CAN. TAX J. 1 (1992). See also Brian J. Arnold
& Tim Edgar, The Draft Legislation on Interest Deductibility: A Technical and Policy Analysis,
40 CAN. TAX J. 267 (1992).
In the United States, section 385 of the Internal Revenue Code, enacted in 1969, authorised
the Internal Revenue Service to issue regulations defining corporate stock and debt for the purposes of U.S. tax law regulations relating to cross border situations which had never been issued
and regulations concerning domestic situations which were issued and then withdrawn. I.R.C. §
385 (1992). In the absence of such regulations, section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code contains the general intercompany pricing rules which could potentially be used to disallow deductions of "excessive" interest payments. I.R.C. § 482 (1992). However, the most important restriction on the deductibility of interest paid by a U.S. subsidiary corporation to its foreign parent
company was enacted by section 7210 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act which added
section 163G) to the Internal Revenue Code. This in essence provides that interest paid by a
corporation to a related person is not currently deductible if the interest is eligible for an exemption or reduction from U.K. tax under a treaty (or is otherwise exempt from U.S. tax) and
the corporation's net interest expense exceeds 50% of its "adjusted" taxable income. Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act, ch. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, 2339 (1989).
The restriction does not defer related party interest deduction if the payer has a debt to
equity ratio, using the adjusted tax basis of assets, of no more than 1.5:1. See, e.g., Jim Fuller,
New Earnings-StrippingRules Under Code Section 163(U) Proposed, 3 TAX NOTES INT'L 730 (July
1991); Carl Estes, Recent Developments in U.S. Taxation of Foreign Direct Investment 45 BULL.
INT'L Fisc. Doc. 17-25 (Jan. 1991).
31 ICTA 1988, ch. 1, § 209(2)(e).
3 id.
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is paid. The other type of clause found in these arrangements, including
that found in the U.K./U.S. Double Taxation Treaty,35 is more widely
worded. The Revenue has always argued this type of clause permits it
to restrict when the amount of the interest paid exceeds that which
would have been paid in the absence of the "special relationship" for
whatever reason. This, in effect, includes a consideration of "thin
capitalisation" policy.
This was the position until recently. At this stage one has a workable set of provisions. Perhaps strangely, the U.K. tax authorities have
no power to regulate with regard to a company's ratio of debt to equity
•capital. Guidelines to their approach are unpublished and strictly informal. Against this background, the rules form a typical compromise under which an unworkably strict statutory provision has been modified
and relaxed. In this case, this has been done under double taxation
agreements. However, the balance in this compromise between the Revenue and
the taxpayer has recently been tilted by further statutory amend36
ment.
A 1992 Special Commissioner's decision opined that regard could
be had only to the rate of interest and not other factors, even where the
wider clause was used. The Revenue immediately announced that this
decision was at variance with its understanding of the law hitherto and
that legislative amendment would follow. Finance (No 2) Act 1992 provided a new rule applicable to interest payments made after 14 May
1992. For such payments, unless the double tax provision specifically
limits the factors to be considered, all relevant factors must be taken
into account. 37 This will in effect bring "thin capitalisation" factors into
play since the factors will include the question of whether the loan
would have been made at all, how much would have been lent, and the
rate of interest. In addition the burden of proof is placed on the paying
company to show that no "special relationship" is in existence, or, if it
is, how much interest would have been paid in its absence.

35 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, Dec. 31, 1975, U.S.-U.K., art. 11, 31
U.S.T. 5668, S.I. 1980, No. 568.
'6 FA 1992, ch. 48, § 52.
'3 Id. § 52(2) states that all factors include:
(a)
the
question whether the
loans would have been made at all in the
absence of the relationship,
(b)
the amount which the loan would have been in the absence of the
special relationship, and
(c)
the rate of interest, and other terms which would have been agreed in
the absence of the relationship.
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There is no doubt that this leaves the rules flexible, not changing
the situation referred to above under which the Revenue has no regulatory powers in relation to debt/equity ratios. On the other hand, it leaves
the law uncertain and provides the Revenue with wide powers. When
these latter points were made during the passage of the Bill through the
House of Commons, all that emerged was a promise from the Financial
Secretary to the Treasury to the effect that "the Revenue does not intend
to challenge every inter-company loan on the basis of the potential thin
capitalisation rules."38
A further result of the same Special Commissioner's decision was
in the sphere of equity notes. The Revenue found the decision unacceptable because the return on the loans was not taxed as interest in the
state of receipt, the U.S. in the particular case, while the paying company was able to obtain a deduction for the interest paid. Such interest is
to be treated as a distribution if paid after 14 May 1992. The drafting
of the amendments is extremely wide, and they are not displaced by the
distribution override provisions referred to above. Despite a further
promise by the Financial Secretary that the amendment "will not operate
solely by virtue of the fact that a parent company has borrowed money
from its subsidiary ' '39 the legislation provides another example of antiavoidance legislation which will only operate satisfactorily if not applied
as drafted. In this sphere there is to be no Statement of Practice or
concession.
III.

A.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

The Ramsay doctrine

The modern era in the judge-made anti-avoidance doctrine began, it
is generally agreed, with the decision in Ramsay v. 11. C.4' The litera-

31 Committee Hearings, 30 June 1992 HANSARD 450.
31 Id. The legislation is to be found in FA 1992, ch. 48, § 31.
40

[1982] App. Cas. 300. The judicial doctrine is normally referred to as "the Ramsay doc-

trine" or "the new approach." Purists confine the term "Ramsay doctrine" to circular, selfcancelling transactions, preferring to refer to the doctrine as that of Furniss v. Dawson, [1984]
App. Cas. 474, when the transactions are linear. The case of LR.C. v. Duke of Westminster,
[1936] App. Cas. 1, had been the bedrock of the earlier judicial attitudes to tax avoidance. In
the oft quoted words of Lord Tomlin:
Every man is entitled if he can to arrange his affairs so that the tax attaching under
the appropriate Acts is less than it would otherwise be. If he succeeds in ordering
them so as to secure that result, then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of
Inland Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax.
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ture and commentaries on that case and Furniss v. Dawson,4 the other
decision forming the basis of the new approach, is voluminous.42
Development since then has seen the doctrine refined, modified and
extended in some situations while treated as inappropriate in others.
In Craven v. White, 43 the court reviewed the Ramsay doctrine and
provided a number of guidelines to aids in its application. The Craven
decision has also received much comment and the aim here is to set
forth the Craven v. White formulation of the Ramsay doctrine, specifically as it was adopted in Hatton v. LRKC., 4 and then to review the

Id. It had been said that the decision required a court to look at the form of a transaction rather
than its substance. Such a formulation is a gross over-simplification. At about the same time the
courts in the U.S. adopted a quite different approach in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
(1935). It was therein held that a corporate reorganisation must serve a business purpose before
it is recognised for tax purposes. Id. at 469. It should be noted that a showing of a business
purpose is not to be confused with the showing of a lack of a tax avoidance motive. See Commissioner v. Wilson, 353 F.2d. 184 (9th Cir. 1965); Chisholm v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 14 (2d
Cir. 1935); Peter Millett, Artijficial Tax Avoidance: The English and American Approach, BRIT.
TAX REV. 327 (1986). Compare Canadian approach as illustrated, for example, in Stubart Investments Ltd v. M.N.R, 84 D.T.C. 6305 (1984).
41 [1984] App. Cas. 474.
42 See, e.g., G.R. Bretten & Fay Stockton, The Ramsay Doctrine, An Interim Review, 1987
BRIT. TAX REv. 280 (1987); S.N. Frommel, Tax Avoidance and the House of Lords: Uncertainty
as DeterrentI, 1984 INTERTAX 378 (Oct. 1984); RICHARD BRAMWELL, ET. AL, TAXATION OF COMPANIES
AND COMPANY RECONSTRUCTIONS 161-90 (1991); William D. Popkin, JudicialAnti-Tax Avoidance
Doctrine in England: A United States Perspective 1991 BRIT. TAX REV. 283 (1991); Tiley, Judicial Anti-Avoidance: The U.S. Alternatives, Parts I & 11 1987 BrIT. TAX REv. 180 (1987).
The leading cases which have not been referred to in the text include I.R.C. v. Burmah Oil
Co., [1982] S.T.C. 30 (H.L.); I.R.C. v. Bowater Property Dev., [1989] App. Cas. 398; Bayliss v.
Gregory, [1980] App. Cas. 896 (reported together with previous case I.R.C. v. Plummer); and
Moodie v. I.R.C., [1991] S.T.C. 433 (C.A.); Stubart Investments Ltd v. The Queen, 84 D.T.C.
6305 (1984) (Canadian case reviewing all the leading English authorities then decided and Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, when rejecting the "business purposes test").
4 [1989] App. Cas. 398.
44 [1992] S.T.C. 140 (Ch.). In this case, by the summer of 1978, it had become clear that
Mrs. Cole (the deceased) was terminally ill. On 2 August 1978, she granted a power of attorney
to her daughter (Mrs. Hatton) and to her solicitor (Mr. Lawson), and expressly authorised them,
jointly and severally, to make gratuitous dispositions of her property in favour of her children
and remoter issue, including Mrs. Hatton.
On 10 August 1978, Mr. Lawson, acting on the advice of a firm which dealt in tax avoidance schemes, executed a settlement (the first settlement) which provided that the trust fund
should be held in trust to pay the income thereof to the deceased for the period of her life or
the period from the execution thereof until midnight on 11/12 August 1978, whichever was the
shorter period, and subject thereto in trust for Mrs. Hatton absolutely. On 11 August 1978, Mr.
Lawson informed Mrs. Hatton that the first settlement had been executed in her favour and
suggested that she take advice as to whether any further action should be taken. As a result a
second settlement was executed on the same day whereby Mrs. Hatton as settlor assigned her interest under the first settlement to trustees, expectant on the termination of the deceased's inter-
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case law since then. Fitzwilliam v. 1.1.C., 45 which will also be referred
to, was decided soon after Hatton. Its facts need not concern us, however, as they related to capital transfer tax which has now been abolished.
Although there was another possible ground for the decision in the
Hatton case, the judge, Chadwick J. concentrated on the anti-avoidance
doctrine, concluding that the Ramsay doctrine applied. He took as his
starting point, Craven v. White, and his judgment was, in effect, based
on his interpretation of Lord Oliver's speech in Craven, treating it almost as if it had the status of a statutory provision. That in itself is not
surprising given that Lord Oliver is a judge in the House of Lords, the
final appellate tribunal, and Chadwick J. sits in the High Court as a
judge at first instance. Chadwick J., however, not only accepted the
conditions, but went on to closely analyze the actual words in which
they were expressed, concentrating on Lord Oliver's speech to the exclusion of other equally authoritative statements of the law. In that sense
the judge treated the speech of Lord Oliver as akin to a statutory provision.
It should be said from the outset that this approach - analyzing
one of many judicial statements in this area of the law as if it enjoyed
such statutory authority - should normally be guarded against and

est, to hold in the trusts of the second settlement. Under the second settlement the trustees were
to hold the fund in trust to pay the income thereof to the deceased until her death or until
midnight on 12/13 August 1978, whichever occurred first, and subject to that, as to capital ana
income, for Mrs. Hatton absolutely.
The deceased died on 20 August 1978. Notices of determination were made against the appellants (the personal representatives of the deceased and the trustees of the second settlement)
on the basis that a chargeable transfer of value had been effected in favour of the appellants by
the deceased on 10 August. The appellants appealed against those determinations contending that
no charge to capital transfer tax arose on the execution of the first settlement because the property had reverted to Mrs. Hatton as settlor within the meaning of the Finance Act of 1975.
Schedule 5, paragraph 4(5) provided: "If the interest comes to an end during the settlor's life
and on the same occasion the property . . . reverts to the settlor, tax shall not be chargeable . . . unless the settlor had acquired a reversionary interest in the property for a consideration in
money or money's worth."
The issues before the Special Commissioners were inter alia: (1) whether the deceased,
rather than Mrs. Hatton, was properly to be treated as the settlor in relation to both settlements;
and (2) whether the principle of fiscal nullity, explained in the Ramsay decision, had any, and if
so what, application to the transactions. The Commissioners confirmed the notices of determination on the ground that the deceased was the settlor of the second settlement having provided
the only funds which were subjected to it so that the property did not revert to Mrs. Hatton
within the meaning of paragraph 4(5).
The Commissioners found that the settlements were transactions preordained to the extent
required for the application of the Ramsay principle. The appellants appealed. Chadwick J. dismissed the appeal. It should be noted that capital transfer tax as such has been abolished and
superseded by inheritance tax.
4' [1992] S.T.C. 185 (C.A.).
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indeed rejected. While the speech of Lord Oliver is undoubtedly an
important one and contains a clear exposition of the relevant principles,
it is not definitive.46
That having been said, this was the approach adopted by Chadwick
J. He thus set out four conditions, laid down by Lord Oliver in Craven
v. White, as being conditions to be satisfied before the Ramsay doctrine
would apply with the result that the transaction at issue could be disregarded. First, the series of transactions was, at the time the intermediate
transaction was entered into, preordained to produce a given result. Secondly, the sole purpose of the intermediate step was to save tax. Thirdly, there was at the time no practical likelihood that the pre-planned
events would not take place. Fourthly, the preordained events actually
did take place. These four stages, suggested by Lord Oliver, were set
out in the judgment of Chadwick J. He then proceeded to consider
each condition in turn.
The crucial condition in the Hatton case was the first. Chadwick J.
rejected the taxpayer's contention that the steps were not preordained,
explaining that this element required merely that: i) steps toward the
second transaction must have been taken upon the completion of the
first transaction; ii) there was an expectation that the second transaction
would be carried through; and iii) there was no likelihood in practice
that it would not be.
In the Fitzwilliam case, "the essential question was whether it was
preordained [that the relevant party] would participate in the last two
steps of the scheme."47 To that extent, therefore, the issue can be
viewed as being the same as in Hatton. The first condition of Lord
Oliver, that the series of transactions was at the time when the intermediate transaction was entered into, preordained in order to produce a
given result, was at issue.

4 Other judges have explained the law in different terms. See, e.g., Lord Templeman's interpretation in Craven v. White:
Dawson decided that where a taxpayer adopts and carries into effect a scheme to
avoid an assessment to tax on an intended transaction by a prior tax avoidance transaction which serves no business purpose except apart from the avoidance of tax which
would otherwise become payable if the taxable transaction were carried out, the court
will construe and apply the taxing statute to the scheme as a whole and not to the
separate transactions which make up the scheme.
-[1989] 1 App. Cas. at 486. Compare also Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Ltd. v. Stokes, [1992] 2 All
E.R. 275 (H.L.), in which the court concentrated on the intention rather than on whether the
steps were preordained.
4 FiRzwilliam, [1992] S.T.C. 185 (C.A.) (per Nourse L.J.).
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Several comments may be made on this decision. First, it was decided by the Court of Appeal so that, like the High Court in Hatton, the
Court was bound by the House of Lords' decision in Craven v White.
Secondly, differences from the decision of Chadwick J. may, however,
be noted. Although the two decisions both turned on the question of
whether the transactions were preordained, the Court of Appeal judges
in Fitzwilliam did not confine themselves to the meaning attributed to
that term by Lord Oliver in the Craven deciion.4" Thirdly, while accepting that the earlier decisions had settled that the Ramsay doctrine
was one of statutory construction, Nourse L.J. in Fitzwilliam explained
the court's function as follows:
[While the Ramsay doctrine has been described as one of statutory
construction] .. .that was without doubt true in the sense that once
the single composite transaction had been identified the question was
whether it was caught by the taxing statute on which the Crown relied.
However, it did not usually involve a question of statutory construction
in the sense that the meaning of the statute was in doubt: usually the
question was whether a statute whose meaning was clear applied to the
single composite transaction. Hence, the principle might equally be
described as one of statutory application.49
So what conclusions can be drawn from these decisions? First,
support is lent to the narrow view favoured by some in the post-Craven
era, that the arguments will, for the present, principally revolve around
the question of whether or not steps are preordained and this question
will be treated as one of fact. In this context it is important to note that
the term preordained was given a strict interpretation in Shepherd v
Lyntress.50 There must not only be a purpose of tax avoidance or mitigation, but it must be the case that treating a number of transactions as
a single composite one has the effect of taking the transaction out of the
statutory purpose of the relief from tax on which the taxpayer relies. A
more specific point, directly relevant to the Hatton case in particular,
was made by Vinelott J. in the Lyntress case: "The brevity of the period ... [between the steps] may be an important or decisive factor in
determining whether the steps were part of a single composite transaction." 51

4g Reference was made to Lord Oliver's speech but the other speeches were also relied
upon. For example, Staughton LJ. quoted from the speeches of Lords Jauncey and Goff in Craven.
49 Fitzwilliam, [1992] S.T.C. 185 (C.A.).
62 T.C. 495 (Ch. 1989).
"' Id. at 555.
50
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Second, the Hatton case confirms one other attitude that can be
perceived throughout the case law. Marketed, pre-packaged schemes of
tax avoidance are likely to fall afoul of the doctrine. There is, not unnaturally, a judicial distaste for the commercialisation of tax avoidance.
Third, little has been added to the law on the role of certainty for
the taxpayer. In Craven v. White the majority thought that such certainty
was important. Even Lord Goff, who gave the leading dissenting speech,
in which he argued powerfully that the anti-avoidance principle should
not be artificially restricted by arguments on questions of fact, referred
to tax avoidance as an "animal [which] is easily recognisable." 52 In
other words, while accepting that taxpayer certainty was important, the
judge did not see it as a real problem. In this context it might be noted
that the Revenue, in their letter of 20 September 198553 dealing with
the routing of losses in the group situation, while recognising that some
uncertainty was inevitable, expressed a readiness to co-operate in reducing uncertainties. The importance of taxpayer certainty has, in theory at
least, been acknowledged, therefore.
The most recent important decision in the area of anti-avoidance is
that of Ensign Tankers Ltd v. Stokes. 54 Its facts can be stated briefly.
The taxpayer company had been successfully engaged in leasing plant.
In 1981 its managing director became aware that first-year allowances
were available for expenditures on film making. As a result, the company entered into two agreements with other companies governed by the
Limited Partnership Act 1907 to engage in film production.
The partnership entered into agreements under which they paid
substantial amounts towards the cost of producing the films and undertook to meet the entire costs of the production and in return proposed to
acquire the ownership rights of the films. Under a number of loan
agreements, the production companies lent to the partnership sufficient
monies for completing the films. The loans were non-recourse loans
repayable only out of the receipts of the films.
The partnership expended $3.25 million to produce and promote
one such film. This was held to be capital expenditure "for a trading

SZ

Craven, [1988] 3 All E.R. at 534 (per Lord Goff).

53 Letter to the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales following meeting
with the Institute and the Law Society.
54 [1992] 2 All E.R. 275 (H.L.). The next important decision is likely to be that of the
House of Lords in Moodie v. JRC., reported at the Court of Appeal's level, [1991] S.T.C. 433
(C.A.). The House of Lords decision, which will consider whether the Ramsay doctrine is applicable to "reverse annuity schemes," is likely to be heard in the middle of 1993. Their earlier
decision, Plummer v. I.R.C., [1980] App. Cas. 896, upholding the validity of such schemes, was
decided before Ramsay. At the least, a full review of the Ramsay doctrine is possible.

19931

UNITED KINGDOM ANTI-A VOIDANCE LAW

purpose" within section 41, of the Finance Act 1971 and eligible for
relief. However, the taxpayer's claim to relief for full cost of the film's
production failed. The non-recourse nature of the borrowing ensured that
the taxpayer would not be liable for the cost of the film in excess of
$3.25 million. The series of transactions forming the basis of this claim
was held to be a composite transaction for the purposes of tax avoidance.
A number of points emerge from the Ensign case. First, the status
of the Ramsay doctrine as a rule of statutory construction is confirmed.
This had become apparent in Craven v. White and was put beyond
doubt in the present case. The approach adopted was put succinctly by
Lord Keith in Craven:
The court must first construe the relevant enactment in order to ascertain its meaning; it must analyse the series of transactions in question,
regarded as a whole, so as to ascertain its true effect in law; and finally it must apply the enactment as construed to the true effect of the
series of transactions and so decide whether or not the enactment was
intended to cover it.55
On one view, to analyze the doctrine as one of statutory construction or "statutory application" is of great practical significance in developing this body of the law. It recognises that a middle course can be
steered through the two extremes of, on the one hand, generalising about
all tax avoidance schemes and, on the other hand, looking at each
scheme in isolation so that no coherent body of law can develop. Indeed
it makes it obligatory to steer this course. In the present case the
scheme was categorised as one in which a taxpayer sought "a reduction
in his taxable income without suffering any loss or expenditure." 56 Perhaps the most significant aspect of Ensign Tankers was the
introduction by Lords Templeman and Goff of a distinction between tax
mitigation and tax avoidance. 57 The latter occurs only when the taxpayer reduces his liability to tax without incurring the loss which entitles
him to that reduction. This point is, of course, at the heart of the actual
decision in the Ensign Tankers case. The decision recognised that tax
mitigation was outside the ambit of the doctrine. Lord Goff described
mitigation as occurring in "cases in which the taxpayer takes advantage
of the law to plan his affairs so as to minimise the incidence of tax."58

55 Craven, [1988] 3 All E.R. at 500.
56 Ensign, [1992] All E.R. at 290.
57 In the earlier case of LR.C. v. Challenge Corp. Ltd,
Templeman had first drawn this distinction.
5' Ensign, [1992] 2 All E.R. at 295.

[1987] App. Cas. 155, Lord
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The other important point to emerge from the decision is that the principles of Ramsay do not authorise the court to disregard all the fiscal
consequences of a single composite transaction on the ground that it
appears that the transaction is a tax avoidance scheme.
However, perhaps, inevitably, a note of caution is needed. The need
for "certainty for the taxpayer" which was accorded some importance in
the majority speeches in Craven v. White, received scant attention. The
fear that the "new approach" might result in unfair and unexpected burdens on a taxpayer who can not know whether the transaction he is
contemplating will fall afoul of the anti-avoidance principles was
recognised and stated. Lords Templeman and Goff answered this concern by noting that schemes falling within the doctrine are easily
recognisable. Such schemes, they noted, which achieve "apparently magical results" 59 and constitute "raids on the public funds,"' are easily
recognisable animals. 61" This suggests that, in the judges' view, the matter is not one which will cause difficulty.
On the other hand, there was express recognition that there might
be difficulty in defining and identifying a single composite transaction
distinct from two or more transactions which are independent. Lord
Templeman saw this as a quite separate problem. He made it clear that
his speech in Ensign Tankers was based on the certainty that a single
composite transaction had taken place. His speech was, therefore, devoted to the method of applying the Ramsay doctrine once the existence of
a composite transaction had been firmly established.62
But in borderline cases, how is one to decide whether or not such
is the case? Lord Templeman simply referred to the difference of judicial opinion on the matter noted in Craven v. White and gave no further
guidance. This was regrettable. The majority view in Craven, as expounded by Lord Oliver, determined that the crucial issue was whether
or riot a series of transactions was preordained, so that it would be
carried through to its conclusion. This would be so if there were no
practical likelihood that the pre-planned events would not take place.
The failure of the Ensign case to lend support or otherwise to this view
is unfortunate since it had appeared that this was an aspect of the doctrine which had become settled. It had, for example, been applied in the
cases of Hatton and Fitzwilliam.

5 Id. at 288 (per Lord Templeman).
60 Id. at 295.
6' Craven, [1988] 3 All E.R. at 534 (per Lord Goff).
6

Ensign, [1992] 2 All E.R. at 278-94.
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Interpretation of Legislative Anti-Avoidance Provisions

In considering the above comments on the role of the judiciary in
developing an anti-avoidance doctrine, it is important to bear in mind
the United Kingdom's traditional approach both to statutory interpretation and to judicial "legislation."" The role played by judges in interpreting specific anti-avoidance provisions has been surprisingly limited.
This is not principally because the judges have shied away from their
task in this sphere but rather because the number of cases in which
taxpayers have challenged the provisions is few. Doubtless the complexity of the legislation has played its role here.
A pertinent area in which judges. have struggled with the complex
statutory terms is the taxation of "transactions in securities." 64 In basic
terms the provisions seek to deal with the mischief which may result
when sums which could come out of a company as income are extracted either in capital form, with the possibility of more beneficial taxation
as a capital gain, or in non-taxable form. In order for charges to apply
under section 703, three conditions must be satisfied. First, there must
be one or more transactions in securities.65 Second, a "tax advantage"
must have been obtained. 66 Third, one of the prescribed circumstances
set out in section 704 must be present. 67 A typical example would be
the receipt of an abnormal dividend through a transaction in securities.
In this case, the taxpayer may avoid assessment if he can show that the
transaction was carried out for bona fide commercial reasons or in the
ordinary course of making or managing investments, and that the main
object, or one of the main objects, of the transaction was not to obtain
a tax advantage. It is crucial that both legs of this requirement are satisfied.
In Hasloch v. LRIC.68 the Revenue was successful because the taxpayer failed to prove that tax avoidance was not one of the motives of

' A comparison with the American approach, for example would need to consider, inter
alia, the U.K. doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty, the differing rules on considering legislative
purpose, the relative ease with which Parliament can correct statutes which prove inadequate or
defective, etc. See Michael Zander, The Law Making Process (2nd ed., 1985); Lord Devlin,
Judges and Lawmakers, 39 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1976); Lord Reid, The Judge as Lawmaker, 12 J.
SoC'Y PUB. Tcmus. L. 22 (1972); P.S. Atiyah, Common Law and Statute Law, 48 MOD. L. REV. 1
(1985); Popkin, supra note 42.
6 ICTA 1988, ch. 1, §§ 703-709.
6' Id. § 709(2).
66 Id. § 709(1).
67 Id. § 704(A)-(E).
" 47 T.C. 50 (Ch. 1971).
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the transaction, even though the bona fide commercial test was satisfied.
In Clark v. LtRC.,69 the taxpayer carried out transactions involving investment companies in order to provide him with funds to purchase land
adjoining his farm. The commercial reasons related to the farming enterprise and not to the companies which were the subject of the
"transaction in securities." Nevertheless, the court held that the commercial reasons need not be directly connected with the company or companies with which the taxpayer was concerned. In LR.C. v. Brebner70 it
was held that transactions were entered into for bona fide commercial
reasons because they were carried out to frustrate an unwelcome takeover bid. The case further demonstrates that a subjective test is to be
used.
It is important to note that section 707 provides a "clearance procedure" whereby the taxpayer can furnish the Board of Inland Revenue
with particulars of transactions which are to be put into effect (or have
been effected) and obtain notification from the Board as to whether or
not it is satisfied that the transactions are such that no action should be
taken against him under section 703(3). Once the Board has notified the
applicant that they are satisfied, then section 703 may not be applied to
the specific transaction referred to in the application.
The two most important cases in interpreting this legislation are
Greenberg v. I.R C.71 and LR C. v. Joiner.2 In the Greenberg case,
both A and R each entered into a contract, before 5 April 1960, with
shareholders for the sale of shares in a company on terms described as
a "forward dividend-stripping operation." In A's case, the purchase price
was paid by instalments as and when dividends were paid on the shares
by the company to be stripped, the greater part being paid after 4 April
1960. In R's case the purchase price was paid immediately, but the
vendor was required to deposit an equal amount with a bank, which was
released to him by instalments depending on the payment of dividends
by the company to be stripped. All the relevant dividends were paid
after 4 April 1960.
The crucial issue on appeal against notices issued under sections
703-709 was precisely when the transactions in securities had taken
place. The House of Lords held, although it was not the sole ground of
their decision, that each payment of a dividend and of the corresponding
instalment of the purchase price was a separate "transaction relating to
securities," thus enabling specific dates to be ascertained. Lord Reid

69 [1978] S.T.C. 614 (Ch.)

70 [1967] 2 App. Cas. 18.
71 [1971] 3 All E.R. 136 (H.L.).
72 [1975] 3 All E.R. 1050 (H.L.).
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said:
The word "transaction" is normally used to denote some bilateral activity, but it can be used to denote an activity in which only a single
person is engaged. It would not be wrong to say of a person doing
office work that he is transacting business. This definition shows that
no bilateral element is necessary for it includes applying or subscribing
for new securities which are single acts done by one person alone.
Then the definition includes not only transactions in securities but
transactions relating to securities. A previous definition states as one
would expect that "securities" include shares. So on the face of it any
single act done by one person alone is a transaction in securities if it
is one "relating to securities." This is a vague phrase but I do not see
how to stop short of giving to it a very wide meaning. Taking acts
done in carrying out these schemes I think that declaration of a dividend and payment of dividend by the taxpayer's company to the finance company were acts relating to shares. Certainly a declaration of
a dividend is an act done relating to the company's shares and if that
is so I do not see how to draw a line and say that the actual payment
of dividends is not also an act relating to the shares.73
Lord Simon of Glaisdale put it thus:
In my view, the payment of each dividend by the company to
Finsbury, and the payment of the corresponding instalment of the purchase price by Finsbury to the Greenbergs, was itself, being a transactions "relating to securities," a "transactions in securities" (within the
meaning of s.4374) in consequence of which a tax advantage was obtained or obtainable. I have already refeired to Inland Revenue Comrs.
75 which I think is authority for this view.76
v. Parker,
In I.R.C. v. Joiner, another section 703 case, Lord Wilberforce speaking
more generally stated:
[w]hereas it is generally the rule that clear words are required to impose a tax, so that the taxpayer has the benefit of doubts or ambiguities, Lord Reid made it clear that the scheme of the sections, introducing as they did a wide and general attack on tax avoidance, required
that expressions which might otherwise have been cut down in the
interest of precision were to be given the wide meaning evidently in-

73

Greenberg, [1972] 3 All E.R at 149.

74 Now ICTA 1988, ch. 1, § 709(2).
7s [1966] App. Cas. 141.
76

Greenberg, [1972] 3 All E.R. at 161.
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tended, even though they led to a conclusion short of which judges
would normally desire to stop.'
These cases are currently of particular importance in view of the
recent attacks by the Revenue against attempts by companies to use
surplus advance corporation tax (ACT).78 In broad terms the Revenue
is seeking to deny parent companies the ability to use tax credits attaching to dividends paid by their subsidiary companies. The situation under
consideration is that a parent company, wishing to make dividend payments, is unable to use the full amount of the ACT against its own or
its subsidiaries' current year mainstream corporation tax liability or
against its previous taxable profits. The problem relates to the surplus
ACT which the parent then has and must use within three years or write
off.

A traditional solution to this problem was to identify a subsidiary
with ACT capacity and cause that subsidiary to pay a dividend to the
parent outside the group income and dividend election. The subsidiary
would then offset the ACT paid against its mainstream corporation tax
liability for the accounting year in which the dividend was paid. The
surplus would be carried back for up to six years and set off against
mainstream tax paid in those years resulting in a repayment of tax to
the subsidiary. The parent company would then offset the tax credit due
to it from the receipt of the franked payment against the ACT payable
on the dividend to its shareholders.
This "tax planning" is now the subject of attack by the Revenue
which is seeking to use both the Ramsay doctrine and section 703. One
aspect of the latter argument is that the payment of a dividend is "a
transaction in securities." The matter is, clearly, of great practical importance. Presently, the Revenue's approach has not been tested by the
courts,79 though negotiations continue in a number of cases. The out-

7' Joiner, [1975] 3 All E.R. at 1055.
71 See Docherty & Smith, Is the Ordinary Abnormal?, TAXATION, 23 April 1992, at 73.
' The November 1992 issue of the Inland Revenue Tax Bulletin (a quarterly document
*
issued by the Revenue since November 1992 setting out their thinking and views on particular
issues) devoted a question to section 703 (Intra-Group Dividends). Particular attention is paid to
the question of when a dividend can be regarded as "abnormal." The following extract exemplifies the Revenue's approach:
Section 703 does not apply where the transactions in question were carried out for
bona fide commercial reasons and the obtaining of a tax advantage was not one of
the main objects of the transactions. This means that Section 703 would not normally
be invoked to counteract a tax advantage which arose through the payment by a subsidiary of a dividend to its parent company outside a group income election unless
there were one or more additional factors involved. Such factors might include the
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come of these cases, which cannot be confidently predicted, is likely to
depend on a number of factors such as whether the subsidiary was acquired principally for tax reasons and whether the price paid reflected
the potential tax benefit.
IV.

THE NTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

As in municipal law, there is a constant fear that taxpayers may
abuse or take advantage of relieving provisions in double taxation agreements. As a result, greater attention has been paid to anti-avoidance or
anti-abuse provisions contained within these agreements.
A.

Double Taxation Agreements

The U.K.'s basic approach is only to grant relief for example to
allow reduced withholding tax rates under the terms of a treaty, subject
to advance authorisation. The Revenue may delay or refuse consent if
the terms of the treaty are being abused in an attempt to avoid the U.K.
tax net. One example of this, the "thin capitalisation rules" has already
been considered above.
In addition, however, a number of the treaties include, in relation to
the reduction of withholding tax rates on dividends, interest and royalties, a rule denying such reductions if the structure was set up, or the
debt claimed created or assigned, mainly for the purposes of taking
advantage of the treaty and not for bona fide commercial reasons.8"
In general, the United Kingdom has not gone as far as the United
States has in insisting on strict "treaty-shopping" clauses.81 The U.K.
began to include such specific anti-avoidance clauses after double taxation treaties extended the dividend imputation tax credit to non-residents.

shares in the subsidiary being transferred within the group with no apparent purpose
other than to enable a dividend to be paid to a company which is in a position to
apply the franked investment income for [setting off losses or for calculating a
company's liability to pay ACT]: the profits out of which the dividend was paid being
artificially created in some way: or the dividend being financed (directly or indirectly)
by the recipient or by another company in the same group. The question of whether a
transaction gives rise to a tax advantage within the scope of Section 703 had to be
decided on the facts and circumstances of the individual case.
m See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, Nov. 7, 1980, U.K.-Neth., art. 10,
para. 6, 1980 Tractenblad van bet Koninkrijk der Nederlanden No. 205, 1980 S.I. No. 1961.
Treaty-shopping refers to a situation in which a resident of one state which is not a party
to a treaty establishes a "body" within a state which is a party to the treaty in order to use the
treaty's benefits or advantages. See the new Netherlands/U.S. Draft Treaty on Taxation, signed on
18 December 1992, containing a comprehensive anti-treaty abuse article.
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The unlimited availability of such credits to non-residents would have
of the Ramsay doctrine to
been very expensive. The possible application
82
tested.
been
yet
not
has
treaty-shopping
In the United States the Internal Revenue Service and the courts
have taken a much stronger position. While, the courts have not gone so
far as to deny recognition to a body83 if that body has a real business
purpose in accordance with Gregory v. Helvering,8 such treatment has
been given to bodies established simply for treaty-shopping purposes.8 5
The OECD has provided a Model Double Taxation Convention
which forms the basis or starting point of many bilateral treaties.86 In
particular the United Kingdom generally uses the Model as a basis for
negotiating double taxation agreements. The United States too has its
own model based on that of the OECD.87
The OECD Model contains no general anti-avoidance provision.88
This was noted by the Report of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs in
198789 which suggested a number of possible ways of dealing with this
lacuna or deficiency. The weight attached to this Report and the problems it highlights with regard to "conduit companies" 9° is impossible to
assess. But the problems pinpointed and the possible solutions will clear-

'n See J.F. Avery-Jones, Anti-Treaty Shopping Articles - A United Kingdom View, 1989
INTERTAX 331 (Sept. 1989).
" The term "body" is used to encompass any legal person and, in particular, corporations.
The term "body of persons" is frequently used in treaties. See Padmore v. I.R.C., [1987] S.T.C.
36 (Ch.).
84 See supra note 39.
8 Johansson v. U.S., 336 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1964); Aiken Industries Inc. v. Commissioner,
56 T.C. 925 (1971) (U.S. case). See Granwell, Life after Rev. RuL 84-152, 1986 BuLL I.B.F.A.
215.
6 The Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Apr. 7, 1977, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
IBFD File.
' June 1981 Model, in MODEL INcoME TAX TREATIES (Kees van Raad ed., Dec. 1983). The
treaty shopping anti-avoidance provision, article 16, was amended in December 1981.
8 C.f, id. Article 16.
9 DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS AND THE USE OF CONDUrr COMPANIES (1987). Suggestions in-

cluded i) the inclusion of provisions which exclude from treaty benefits any company which is
used merely as a "channel" for payment of the income to a resident of a third company; or ii)
the inclusion of "bona fide" provisions which may limit treaty benefits to companies set up for
bona fide purposes and not simply to take advantage of treaty benefits.
9' The typical "conduit company" is set up in a state which is a a party to a treaty in
order to receive income. The "conduit" may not be recognised as a body of persons or as a
legal entity if it is not "liable to tax . . . by reason of ...

domicile, residence, place of

management or any other criterion of a similar nature." OECD Model Double Taxation Convention, supra note 85, art. 4, para. 1. See also R.T. Bartlett, The Making of Double Taxation
Agreements, 1992 BRIT.TAX REV. 76, 77 (1991) (on negotiating double tax agreements).
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ly be factors borne in mind by those negotiating or re-negotiating bilateral treaties. 9
B.

EC Directives

With effect from 1 January 1992, a new dimension has been added
to tax planning for groups of companies operating in Europe through the
introduction of two significant measures aimed at European corporation
tax harmonisation. 92 On 23 July 1990, the Council of the European
Community adopted three measures in the field of direct company taxation with a view to solving a number of problems on a community-wide
basis:
i)

ii)
iii)

a Directive on the common system of taxation applicable to
mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares
concerning companies of different Member states ("the Mergers
Directive"); 93
a Directive on the common system of taxation applicable in the
case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member
states ("the Parent/Subsidiary Directive"); 4
a convention on the elimination of double taxation in connection
with the adjustment of profits of associated enterprises ("the
Arbitration Convention")."

The two Directives took direct effect on 1 January 1992 and implementing legislation is contained in the Finance Act (No. 2) of 1992. The
Arbitration Convention has not been ratified by every Member State and
is not yet operative.
The "single market" only has any meaning if firms are able to
operate within the Community on the basis that domestic rules of taxation will not hinder the expansion of cross-border business activity. The
objective of the Directives is to remove the tax barriers in two specific
spheres. The Mergers Directive aims to enable companies from different
Member states to merge or demerge their business operations without

", The OECD has now published its model, in the form of a looseleaf volume, updated as
of 1 September 1992. Alterations to the text of the Model itself are minimal and do not affect
the above decisions.
92 Parent-Subsidiary Directive, 1990 OJ. (L 225) 6; Mergers Directive, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 1.
See also Robert H. Boon & Hachiel V. Lambourj, EC Parent-Subsidiary Directive: Steps Towards Harmonization of Direct Taxes, TAX PLAN. INT'L REv. 7 (April 1991).
'9 Mergers Directive, supra note 92.
9
Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 91.
" See David Williams, The British Reaction to the French Package, 1991 INTERTA 560, 564
(Dec. 1991).
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giving rise to immediate capital gains tax charges. Although the Mergers
Directive deals with four types of transaction, only transfers of assets
and exchanges of shares are dealt with in the implementing legislation.96 The aim of the Parent/Subsidiary Directive is to eliminate double taxation of dividends flowing from a subsidiary in one Member
State to a parent company in another.9 7 It thus abolishes withholding
taxes on such dividends by exempting the dividends from tax in the
hands of the parent, or by requiring the parent company state to allow
relief for tax paid in the subsidiary state on profits out of which dividends are paid. Little U.K. legislation is needed in order to implement
this Directive as existing law, in essence, provided the relief required.
The bulk of the implementing legislation9 relates to "the Mergers
Directive" including specific anti-avoidance provisions." The relief will
not be available unless the transfer of the trade or part of the trade is
effected for bona fide commercial reasons not forming part of a scheme
or arrangement of which the main purpose is avoidance of liability to
income tax, corporation tax or capital gains tax. A clearance procedure
is, however, provided. A similar anti-avoidance provision and clearance
procedure already exists for domestic "paper for paper" takeovers. 1' °
These latter rules were initially introduced in the Finance Act 1977. At
that time, a Ministerial assurance was given on behalf of the then
Labour Government that "[w]e are seeking to stop major tax avoidance
schemes. That is all we are about. We are not seeking to catch the
innocent taxpayer."0 1
The general understanding of the intention of the legislation was
that the government was anxious to stop transaction schemes which resulted in a deferral of capital gains tax but with the benefit of the sale
proceeds being made directly available to the shareholders. It appears,
however, that the Board of Inland Revenue is reluctant to grant clearance where one company acquires another with part of the consideration
being satisfied by the issue of loan stock that is redeemable within a
relatively short period, if the Board considers that the company had
sufficient cash reserves to have bought the shares for cash had the par-

96 FA 1992, ch. 48, §§ 44-49.
9" See Fred C. de Hosson, The Parent-Subsidiary Directive, 1990 INTERTAX 414, 416 (Oct.
1990).
98 See supra note 78. FA 1992, ch. 48, § 30, is the only provision on the Parent-Subsidiary
Directive.
99 See Schonewille, supra note 4.
100 Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act, 1992, § 135 (Eng.)
101 Statement by Sir Joel Barnett, Financial Secretary to Treasury, Committee Hearings, 12
May 1977, HANSARD 126.
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ties chosen so to structure the transaction."°
Two points might be made on the anti-avoidance provision in the
Mergers Directive. First, it is too soon to know whether it will be
applied in the same way as the existing municipal law provision.
Secondly, it is applicable not only to share exchanges but also to transfers of assets.
The Mergers Directive also sets out a further important anti-avoidance provision." Its provision and relief are applicable only to companies which are resident in a Member state and also which are not,
under the terms of any double taxation agreement concluded between a
Member state and a country outside of the European Community, considered to be resident for tax purposes in a country outside of the Community. The purpose is to deal with companies which are dually resident
for taxation purposes in an EC country and in another country outside
of the EC in circumstances such that the double taxation treaty treats
them as a resident of the non-Community country so that future profits
and gains which might otherwise have been taxed in a EC country are
excluded by virtue of the double tax treaty provisions.
Such companies
14
are prevented from taking advantage of the Directive. 0
The anti-avoidance content of the Parent/Subsidiary Directive is
phrased in different, more general terms. The second paragraph of Article 1 provides that the Directive shall not preclude the application of
domestic or agreement based provisions required for the prevention of
fraud or abuse. This, obviously is a clause drawn in the widest of terms.
It represents a vivid example of a mismatch between the concepts of the
British tax system and that of some other members of the Community.
No equivalent of the French "abus de droit" exists under U.K. law.'0 5
The basic question left open by such a broadly drawn provision is
whether Member states are free to define the concepts of fraud and
abuse, which will inevitably lead to substantial variation, or whether a
"European" concept will emerge."° The role of the Court of Justice in
Luxembourg is likely to be crucial in this sphere.

'02 Letter from Inland Revenue to Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales
published on 10 April 1987.
103 Mergers Directive, supra note 92, clause 11.
04 The Mergers Directive also allows a Member State to refuse to grant its benefits where

the merger, division, transfer of assets, or exchanges of shares would result in failure of the
company to fulfill the necessary conditions for the representation of employees on the company
organs according to the arrangements which were in force prior to that transaction.
s See supra note 1.
100 See Schonewille, supra note 4, at 13.
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CONCLUSION

To attempt to extract an underlying rationale or a series of general
principles when viewing the U.K. approach to tax avoidance would be a
fruitless exercise. Certain trends can, however, be detected. As indicated,
piecemeal development has resulted in a complex interrelationship
among treaty, statutory and case law. Added to this is the expanding
role of the Inland Revenue in this sphere. While Revenue Statements of
Practice do not have the force of law, for all practical purposes they
constitute, until successfully challenged, the applicable rules for any area
to which they are relevant. The extrastatutory concessions of the Revenue are also important. The use of broadly worded legislation with an
accompanying concession to mitigate the rigours of a literal interpretation of the provisions is an increasing practise. This is nothing less than
legislation by the Revenue and is a worrysome development. Consultation conducted by the Revenue, where a draft concession is published
before effect is given to it, either in a modified or precisely the same
form, is no substitute for Parliamentary scrutiny. The claim of the Revenue that concessions,
are made to deal with what are, on
anomalies ... and to meet cases of
code where a statutory remedy would
run to a length out of proportion to
matter,"°7

the whole, minor or transitory
hardship at the margins of the
be difficult to devise or would
the intrinsic importance of the

is totally at odd with the facts.
The point has been illustrated above by the consideration of the
group relief amendments. The legislation seems to control a whole range
of situations outside the scope of the judicial decision it was designed to
reverse. The promised concession, deals not with "minor or transitory
anomalies," but with transactions and arrangements of significant commercial importance.
Each concession is accompanied by a general statement that a concession will not be given where an attempt is made to use it for tax
avoidance. This was held to be a proper and lawful exercise of discretion and in no way discriminatory in R. v I.RC., ex part Fulford
Dobson.' The principle enunciated in this decision is easy to understand and justify. It is wholly sensible for the Revenue, having offered a
concession, to take steps to prevent its abuse. The argument that conces-

107 Inland Revenue Press Release, 16 February 1989, [1989] S.T.I. 74.

[1987] Q.B. 978.
[s
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sions are not themselves lawful is no longer tenable,1" if indeed it ever was. In deciding whether tax avoidance is at the root of the claim to
use the concession, the courts have at their disposal the case law emanating from the Ramsay decision. Quite clearly, however, this procedure
and use of concessions is totally different from that exemplified by the
amendments to group relief.
One further aspect of extra-statutory considerations is illustrated by
the recent case of Campbell, Connelly & Co. v. Barnett.1
The facts
of the case need not be considered. The main issue the case related to
the correct interpretation to be afforded to section 175(1) of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act of 1992, a provision extending the scope
of rollover relief in relation to groups of companies. It reads:
...
for the purposes of section 152-158 [roll-over relief] all the
trades carried on by members of a group of companies shall, for the
purposes of corporation tax on chargeable gains, be treated as a single
trade (unless it is a case of one member of the group acquiring, or
acquiring the interest in, the new assets from another or disposing of,
or of the interest in, the old assets to another)."'
The judge in the case, Knox J., concluded that this subsection does not
permit gains realised by one company in a group to be rolled into replacement assets acquired by another member. This may well represent
an exemplary exercise of statutory interpretation. The problem is that
Revenue statutory concessions have accepted that a "roll-over" in such
circumstances is permissible and tax planning by companies has commonly been based on this premise. 2 From the anti-avoidance point of
view, the case is a further demonstration of the problems caused by
inadequate legislation being supplemented by Revenue concession.
However, it may at least be said of concessions that they are in
published form and there is authority" 3 for the principle of "legitimate
expectation" used in administrative law. In other words, in the absence
of special circumstances, a taxpayer should be able to rely on a published concession and to apply for judicial review if it is dened. 1 4
1R.
v. LJ.C., ex parte Kaye, [1992] S.T.C. 581 (Q.B.).
no [1992] S.T.C. 316 (Ch.).
111 Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act, 1992, ch. 12, § 175(1).
1'2 93 ESC D19 and S/P 8/81. The Revenue have issued a Press Release indicating that they
will continue to apply the concession and practice, despite the judges remarks in Camnpbel4
Connelly, [1992] S.T.C. 316.
"' Preston v. I.R.C., [1985] I App. Cas. 835; R. v. I.R.C., ex parte M.F.K. Underwriting
Agencies, Ltd., [1990 1 All E.R. 91 (Q.B.).
114 For a recent House of Lords case illustrating the increasing role of judicial review in
taxation, see Woolwich Equitable Building Society v. LRC., [1992] S.T.C. 657 (H.L.).
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In other realms, the Revenue's discretionary powers15 are free
from such constraint. The policies underlying the decision to "attack" a
particular type of transaction are not published and therefore, not a matter for scrutiny or challenge. Reference has been made above to the
Revenue's new attitude toward the surplus advance corporation tax problem. While activities which the Revenue regard as pure tax avoidance
can expect to be challenged, it is more difficult to understand why
transactions and practices which were long viewed as acceptable and
commercially prudent can suddenly be regarded as potential vehicles for
tax avoidance. It has been made clear by the judges that they must not
"stand still" in the face of more sophisticated techniques of tax avoidance." 6 The same must apply, also to the Revenue. That having been
said, it is difficult to justify a change in policy towards a hitherto acceptable transaction without any statement of the new approach and the
principles on which it will be applied.117
In drawing any conclusions on the present role of the judiciary and
case law in the field of anti-avoidance, it is important to avoid a dichotomy between judicial decisions on anti-avoidance and the other restraints. Ex hypothesi a limited number of cases reach the courts and are
reported. 8 But the judicial attitude to anti-avoidance cases and the
status of the Ramsay doctrine have an importance which transcends the
actual cases decided. The judicial attitude must inevitably guide the
Revenue. The view taken by the judges on the distinction between tax
mitigation and tax avoidance and on the point at which desirable commercial prudence becomes unacceptable tax avoidance is the background
against which all disputes between the Revenue and a taxpayer take
place.

15 The term here is not used in its strict technical sense for administrative law purposes.
116

Rainsay, 54 T.C. at 187 (per Lord Wilberforce).

The term "acceptable" does, of course, beg many questions. Distinguishing between tax
avoidance and commercial prudence does, of necessity, involve a value judgment. This dichotomy
pervades anti-avoidance law. One man's tax avoidance scheme is another man's commercially acceptable transaction. Judges and commentators alike have tended to assume that there is such an
animal as "an ordinary commercial transaction." The view that some form of moral judgment is
involved was expressly rejected by Lord Goff in Craven v. White: "[A]ny idea that the principle
in Ramsay is a moral principle . . . is . . . destroyed by the recognition of the . . . principle as a principle of statutory construction." [1988] 3 All E.R. at 531. It is interesting to note
that a recent National Audit Office Report entitled Countering VAT Avoidance accepts, and indeed is based upon, the dichotomy between acceptable and unacceptable tax avoidance.
"8 At present, the first level of appeal from an inspector of tax is to a body of General
Commissioners who are comprised of laymen or to a Special Commissioner. The decisions of the
Commissioners are not, at present, reported, though the Revenue have access to them. Power to
report selected decisions of Special Commissioners has been introduced. FA 1992, ch. 48, § 3.
The provision is an enabling one and has not yet been given effect.
'
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In 1985 the Revenue set out its views on the Ramsay doctrine as
extended.119 It was accepted that the doctrine had brought a measure
of uncertainty to tax planning. This was seen as inevitable. However,
the Revenue outlined its views as to the applicability of the doctrine in
particular areas. Though the views were necessarily general, the guidance given was helpful. However, the case law has moved on since then
and Revenue practice has moved on with it. If, as suggested, the judicial
decision and statements, especially those made in the House of Lords,
have an importance beyond the specific facts and law being passed
upon, it is essential to study in detail each decision to ascertain whether
there has been some refinement, or a change of emphasis or additional
limitation added. For what is certain in this ever changing field of antiavoidance, is that no general anti-avoidance provision will be added by
legislation in the foreseeable future and that the Ramsay doctrine or
"new approach" will continue to evolve and develop. To an extent
which is very unusual in the House of Lords, most of the present judges
have made their particular approach to the anti-avoidance doctrine clear.
Significant changes may come with the appointment of new judges.

119 TR 588 (Exchanges of correspondence between Inland Revenue and Institute of Chartered

Accountants in England and Wales on the effects of Furniss v. Dawson).

